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A strong cooperative culture, where individuals contribute to social causes and refrain from 
selfishly overusing existing common resources, is central to the well-being of any society.  However, 
the degree of cooperation and the enforcement mechanisms in place to sustain cooperative 
behaviors vary dramatically across countries.  This paper investigates the impact of institutions on 
social cooperation.  Furthermore, we explore the way in which the framing of a decision interacts 
with institutional norms to result in different levels of cooperation.  We run a controlled laboratory 
experiment in which participants are randomly exposed to either a “strong” or “weak” institutional 
environment and then asked to participate in a social dilemma, modeled as a public goods game 
and framed as either “giving” to or “taking” from a common project.  Experimental results indicate 
that institutions have an impact on cooperative behavior in the social dilemma.  Specifically, we find 
that participants exposed to a strong institution cooperate at a higher rate than participants 
assigned to a weak institution condition, and that these differences increase over time through 
learning. Further, we find that being in the taking frame generates higher rates of free-riding in the 
public goods game, relative to the giving frame, although it is not significantly related to the total 
level of contributions to a common project. Finally, we find that the interaction of framing and 
institutional history has a significant impact on cooperation specifically through free-riding in the 
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1. Introduction  
 
Many important social problems – including the provision and maintenance of a variety of 
public resources and global issues such as climate change – require the cooperation of unrelated 
individuals in situations where the collective benefit is jeopardized by actions motivated by self-
interest.  Thus, a strong cooperative culture, where individuals contribute to productive social 
causes and refrain from overusing existing common resources, is central to the well-being of any 
society.  
 Theories of free-riding predict that individual decision-making is dominated by self-interest 
– that is, that individuals will select a selfish action over a socially optimal one.  These theories 
predict that few will contribute to social causes and that any contributions should be small in 
magnitude. However, millions of people contribute to public goods such as common recreation 
areas, public broadcasting, and community organizations.  Laboratory experiments confirm that 
individuals are significantly more likely to cooperate than the free-rider hypothesis predicts, and 
that levels of cooperation are substantially higher than economists would expect (Andreoni, 1995a; 
Gächter and Herrman, 2009; see Ledyard, 1995 for further discussion).   
Although real-world and laboratory studies show that individuals do contribute to social 
causes, the degree of cooperation varies dramatically across countries, as do the enforcement 
mechanisms set in place to sustain cooperative behavior.  Several authors have shown that 
choosing subjects from different countries to participate in laboratory and non-laboratory 
experiments generates significant cross-cultural variation in cooperation (Gächter, Herrmann, and 
Thöni, 2010; Henrich et al., 2001; Oosterbeek et al., 2004; Roth et al., 1991).  
These experimental findings are consistent with the findings of natural experiments like the 
one conducted by Fisman and Miguel (2007), who analyze the parking behavior of United Nations 
officials in Manhattan before and after a change in legal enforcement.  Prior to November 2002, 
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diplomats were given immunity from legal repercussions for committing a parking violation – thus, 
their parking behavior was determined by cultural norms alone.  In 2002, a legal change gave 
enforcement authorities the ability to confiscate the diplomatic license plates of diplomats 
incurring parking violations. The authors find that diplomats from high-corruption countries 
systematically incurred greater numbers of unpaid parking violations than diplomats from 
countries with lower levels of corruption prior to the legal change.  The number of unpaid 
violations dropped dramatically after the change in enforcement mechanisms. Fisman and Miguel’s 
results clearly illustrate that (1) behavior is influenced by cultural norms and (2) that external 
institutions can change behavior.  Thus, understanding the factors that contribute to the 
development of cultural institutions and behavioral nudges that could promote cooperation among 
individuals is of great interest.  
 In order to understand such behavioral nudges, it is critical to understand not only the way 
in which exposure to cultural institutions influences an individual’s decision in a social-dilemma, 
but also the way in which the dilemma itself is presented to an individual.  A vast body of economic 
and psychological literature demonstrates the presence of a framing effect: the way in which a 
situation is presented can change behavior, even if the underlying decision and information remain 
the same.  In particular, the ways in which a decision is labeled and normatively described (as 
positive or negative) have been shown to alter cooperative behavior in the context of social 
dilemmas (Andreoni, 1995b; Elliott, Hayward and Canon, 1998; Park, 2000; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981)1. Goerg and Walkowitz (2010) conduct a multi-national laboratory experiment to 
consider the cooperation levels of subjects from different cultural backgrounds in social dilemmas 
framed as generating either positive or negative externalities. They find that subjects from China 
and West Bank are more cooperative when a dilemma is framed positively than when an identical 
                                                          
1
 See also Sonnemans, Shram, and Offerman, 1998; Cookson, 2000; Dufwenberg, Gachter, and Hennig-
Schmidt, 2011; and Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 1999. 
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dilemma is framed as generating a negative externality. There is no such significant effect found for 
participants from Jerusalem and Helsinki. Goerg and Walkowitz’ results suggest that frames do not 
affect all subjects equally, but instead interact with culture to result in different levels of 
cooperation. 
 This study seeks to build upon previous literature about the effects of framing and cultural 
institutions on prosocial behavior to understand more clearly the mechanisms through which 
framing and institutions interact to influence cooperation.  To our best knowledge, previous 
literature on the role of cultural institutions has been unable to establish the direction of causality: 
it is unclear whether strong institutions cause individuals in a given society to behave in a prosocial 
manner or whether it is the inherently cooperative nature of the members of the society that causes 
them to set up such strong institutions in the first place.  As a result, this literature has been unable 
to expound upon whether it is institutions or individual preferences that interact with framing to 
result in varied levels of cooperation across groups.  We use a controlled laboratory environment in 
which we randomly assign subjects to different institutional environments in order to observe the 
causal impact of institutions on prosocial behavior.  This experimental approach allows us to 
control all factors that could potentially influence cooperation other than the two conditions of 
interest – exposure to institutions and framing. 
 The first part of this experiment builds on previous work by Peysakhovich and Rand (2012) 
with subjects being randomly assigned to treatments with “strong” or “weak” institutions within 
the context of a repeated modified prisoner’s dilemma game.  The prisoner’s dilemma is a social 
dilemma in which an individual must decide whether to cooperate with or defect on another 
individual. In a classical one-shot prisoner’s dilemma, the social optimum is for both players to 
cooperate, but the Nash equilibrium strategy is for both to defect. We modify the classical game so 
that participants’ decisions are subject to being audited, and if a decision is audited, participants 
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can be punished for choosing to defect.  Additionally, we select game parameters such that in the 
strong institution condition mutual cooperation is an equilibrium strategy (in addition to mutual 
defection) whereas in the weak institution condition the only Nash equilibrium is (defect, defect). 
Thus, in the strong institution condition, the social dilemma turns into a coordination game, while 
in the weak institution condition it remains a prisoner’s dilemma. 
 The second part of this experiment is designed to measure the impact of the institutions set 
up in the first part on behavior in the public goods game, a social dilemma in which subjects must 
choose whether and how much of their personal endowment to contribute to a common  project 
that benefits all participants.  The socially optimal outcome is for all participants to contribute their 
entire endowment. However, since participants benefit from the public good regardless of their 
contribution, economic theory predicts that individuals will maximize their own payoffs by “free-
riding” on the contributions of others.  
 The standard public goods game is presented to subjects as a decision whether and how 
much to “give” to a public good.  Thus, the selfish choice is the default: to take no action and not 
contribute.  To consider the impact of framing on prosocial behavior, I reframe the standard public 
goods game in terms of “taking” from a public good.  Here, the cooperative choice is the default: to 
contribute to the public good by not taking from it. Keeping payoffs and all other information 
constant across the two frame treatments, I am able to isolate the pure effect of the interaction 
between the institutional background and framing of individual actions on social welfare. 
 Experimental results indicate that both institutions and framing have a significant impact 
on cooperative behavior in social dilemmas.  Specifically, we find that participants exposed to a 
strong institution in Part 1 cooperate at a higher rate than participants exposed to a weak 
institution condition. This difference in cooperation persists over all 30 rounds and is increased 
over time through learning. We also find that being in the taking frame in Part 2 generates higher 
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rates of free-riding than the giving frame; this result is inconsistent with our original hypothesis 
and its implications are discussed later in the paper. Free-riding also appears to be the mechanism 
through which the interaction of framing and institutional history affects cooperation in the public 
goods game; we find a statistically significant effect of each of our four unique treatment conditions 
on the probability that a participant will free-ride on the contributions of others.  Effects on 
cooperation levels are inconclusive.  
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental design, 
methodology, and data; Section 3 describes the empirical strategy; Sections 4 and 5 discuss results; 













2. Experimental Methodology and Framework  
 
2.1 Experimental Design 
 
The experimental framework consists of three parts. In Part 1, participants are primed with 
either a “strong” or “weak” external institution through a series of repeated interactions.  Part 2 
measures participants’ level of prosocial behavior through a public goods game framed in one of 
two ways. Part 3 asks participants to complete a risk assessment survey. All participants are asked 
to complete a brief demographic questionnaire after the completion of the experiment. In sum, the 
experimental treatments form the below 2x2 design:  
 “Giving” Frame “Taking” Frame 
“Weak” institution  
 
 




Figure 1: 2x2 experimental design allows us to consider the interaction of institutional history and 
framing on cooperative behavior.  
 
All experimental treatments are programmed in the experimental program zTree2. 
        
2.1.1 Part 1 – External Institutions. 
 
In Part 1, participants are assigned to one of two institution treatment conditions:  “strong” 
or “weak”. All participants in a given session are assigned to the same treatment condition. We 
define a “strong” institution as one in which defection is consistently detected and reliably 
punished.  A “weak” institution, then, is one in which defection is either not consistently detected or 
not reliably punished.  In order to model strong and weak institutions, we have participants 
participate in a series of repeated 2-player interactions. In each round, there is a probability, q, that 
                                                          
2 Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments. 





the round will be audited; this audit probability is varied between treatments. In order to isolate 
the effect of external institutions and prevent reputation-building, the probability of being matched 
with the same partner in a subsequent rounds is kept constant at 0.5 in both institutional condition 
treatments.  
At the beginning of each interaction, participants are randomly matched in pairs.  Each 
interaction consists of a number of rounds and each round consists of a single decision.  In each 
round, participants are asked to select between two options, A and B. Their payoffs are determined 
based on the payoff matrix in Figure 2 (shown in experimental points).  After each round, each 
player learns his or her individual payoff and the decision of the other player.  Participants then 
play another round with the same partner (with probability 0.5) or begin a new interaction with a 
different partner (with probability 0.5). Participants receive information about whether they are 
playing another round with the same partner or have been rematched for a new interaction before 
the start of each new round. Participants in both treatments play a total of 30 rounds.  
 In each round, a participant’s decision is subject to an audit with audit probabilities of 0.125 
for weak institutions and 0.875 for strong institutions.  Audited decisions are subject to punishment 
in the case of defection.  If a decision is audited and participant i chooses to defect, then he or she 
will receive 0% of their payoff for the round regardless of the decision of participant j. The payoff 
scheme is symmetric – if participant j chooses to defect, then he or she will receive 0% of their 
payoff for the round, regardless of the decision of participant i.  
 Audit probabilities are selected such that in the weak treatment participants play a 
stochastically repeated prisoner’s dilemma and that in the strong treatment participants play a 
repeated coordination game. Parameters are selected to result in different games under different 
institutions in order to capture the effect of institutions instead of just norms.  This reflects the 
notion that institutions “change the game” – they do not only influence individuals by changing 
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their beliefs, but by truly changing the decisions and outcomes of a situation. By running these two 
treatments we are able to distinguish the impact of institutions from the influence of norms.  In the 
latter case, individuals may cooperate, not because it makes rational sense to do so, but because of 
social norms; in the former coordination game scenario, the financial payoffs are set up to 
incentivize cooperation.  
We predict that changing the parameters to create a coordination game with two equilibria 
in the strong condition will “teach” participants to cooperate. Conversely, we expect that the low 
probability of being audited in the weak condition will lead participants to learn to defect. At the 
end of Part 1, one round is randomly selected and the payoffs from that round are used to calculate 
participants’ earnings in the experiment in order to prevent income effects from affecting behavior 
in later rounds. 
  Player j 
  Option A Option B 
Player i  Option A 6, 6 0, 10 
Option B 10, 0 2, 2 
       
Figure 2: Raw payoffs for Players i and j (Part 1) 
 
   
 In the weak institution treatment, the probability of being audited in a given round is 0.125.  
Thus, the expected payoff matrix for participant i is calculated by calculating the expected values for 
each possible combination of i and j’s decisions using the audit probability q = 0.125.  Since payoffs 








EV (A,A) = (1)(6) = 6 
EV (A,B) = (1)(0) = 0 
EV (B,A) = (0.125)(0) + (0.875)(10) = 8.75 
EV (B,B) = (0.125)(0) + (0.875)(2) = 1.75 
 
 
Figure 3: Expected value calculations and payoffs for participants i and j in the weak institution 
treatment condition.  
 
 The payoff matrix in Figure 3 shows that regardless of the decision of participant j, it is 
profit-maximizing for participant i to select option B – thus, the Nash equilibrium strategy for i is to 
always select Option B, or to defect. The dominant strategy for j is the same: to always choose 
Option B.  This results in a single Nash equilibrium in which both i and j defect by choosing Option 
B, leading to a collective outcome of only 3.5 experimental points, relative to the socially optimal 
outcome of (A,A) which results  in a collective 12 experimental points (6 experimental points each 
for i and j). Since there is only one Nash equilibrium, defect-defect, the selected parameters in the 
weak condition result in a classic prisoner’s dilemma game designed to elicit uncooperative 
behavior among participants.  
 The raw payoff matrix in the strong institution condition is identical to the weak institution 
condition (shown in Figure 1), however the higher probability of being audited (0.875) significantly 
changes the expected value payoff matrix.  The expected payoff matrix in this treatment for 
participants i and j is shown in Figure 4. As before, payoffs are symmetric, so the expected value 
calculations for participants i and j are identical.  
 
EV (A,A) = (1)(6) = 6 
EV (A,B) = (1)(0) = 0 
EV (B,A) = (0.875)(0) + (0.125)(10) = 1.25 




Figure 4: Expected value calculations and payoffs for participants i and j in the strong institution 
treatment condition.  
 
 Option A Option B 
Option A 6, 6  0, 8.75 
Option B 8.75, 0 1.75, 1.75  
 Option A Option B 
Option A 6, 6  0, 1.25 
Option B 1.25, 0 0.25, 0.25  
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 The payoff matrix in Figure 4 shows that in the strong institution condition participants are 
actually playing a coordination game in which there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria, (A,A) 
and (B,B).  Consider the decision of participant i. If participant j chooses option A, then the profit-
maximizing strategy for i is to select option A as well.  If participant i believes that j will choose 
option B, then the profit-maximizing strategy for i is to choose Option B. Critically, in this treatment 
mutual cooperation (A, A) is an equilibrium condition – in fact, it is the payoff dominant 
equilibrium.  However, it must be noted that previous literature has shown that coordination 
failures do occur (Van Huyck et al., 1990), and people do sometimes select defection over the payoff 
dominant equilibrium. In this particular treatment condition, we expect that the much higher 
expected payoffs associated with the payoff dominant equilibrium – 24 times greater than the 
individual and collective benefits of the equilibrium (B,B) – will be salient enough to encourage 
learned cooperation among participants.  
 
2.1.2 Part 2 – Framing of the Public Goods Game 
 
In Part 2 participants are assigned to one of two frame treatments: “giving” or  
“taking” and play a one-shot linear public goods game in which they are asked to choose a level of 
cooperation from a set of possible actions.  All participants in a session are assigned to the same 
treatment condition. At the beginning of Part 2, participants are randomly matched into groups of 
four to play a linear public goods game.  All participants simultaneously decide how many points to 
contribute to a common project that benefits all participants equally – either by “giving” to the 
common project or refraining from “taking” from it, depending on the treatment condition. 
Contributions are multiplied by an efficiency factor and redistributed equally to all participants.  
Expected utility theory predicts that these two frames are equivalent, since the underlying 
structures of the games, dominant strategies, and payoff mechanisms are identical. In both the 
“giving” and “taking” frames of the public goods game in Part 2, participant i’s payoff consists of two 
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parts: (1) the number of points in their private account – which depends on their decisions alone – 
and (2) the number of points redistributed to them from the common project – which is dependent 
upon their behavior as well as the behavior of others in the group. Thus, any observed difference in 
cooperation between the two treatments can be attributed to the existence of a framing effect and 
is not driven by differences in the structures of the games. The equivalence of the two experimental 
treatments is expounded upon in the following subsections outlining the details of each treatment 
condition. 
 
2.1.2.1 “Giving” to a Common Project  
 
Participants are randomly matched into groups of 4 to play a standard linear public  
goods game. They are told that they have been matched with three other individuals in the room, 
but do not have information regarding who the individuals in their group are or their decisions in 
Part 1 of the experiment. Participants begin the game with an endowment, e, which is equal in 
magnitude for all participants.  Each participant must then simultaneously decide how many points, 
in integer values (minimum 0, maximum e), he or she wishes to give to a common project (ci) which 
benefits all participants equally.  All contributions to the common project are multiplied by an 
efficiency factor, m, and redistributed equally to all participants. In this experiment, the initial 
endowment given to participants is 10 experimental points and contributions to the public good are 
scaled by an efficiency factor of 2.  
 Participant i’s payoff is calculated by subtracting the amount contributed to the common 
project from the initial endowment, then adding i’s share of total contributions scaled by the 
efficiency factor. Formally, i’s payoffs are represented by the general and specific payoff functions in 




Equation 1:          (    )  
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  Equation 2:           (     )  
 
 
∑   
 
    
 
Where e is the initial endowment, ci is the contribution to the public good, m is the efficiency factor, 
and n is the group size. 
 
 The dominant Nash equilibrium strategy for participant i is to not contribute any 
experimental points to the common project.  Since all participants receive an equal share of the 
total contributions to the common project (after they are scaled by the efficiency factor), even if i 
doesn’t contribute, he or she will still be able to reap the benefits of the common project while 
retaining all his or her initially endowed points.  Thus, the profit-maximizing strategy is to not 
contribute any points to the common project, and to free-ride on the contributions of others. The 
collectively optimal choice is to contribute all of one’s endowment to the common project in order 
to maximize group payoff. The profit-maximizing strategies of the other three players in the group 
are analogous.  
2.1.2.2 “Taking” from a Common Project  
The design of the “taking” frame is analogous to that of the “giving” frame. However, instead 
of contributing to the common project, participants must decide whether and how many 
experimental points to take from the common project for their private accounts.  To keep the game 
structure identical to the “giving” frame, the common project begins with 40 experimental points 
and participants can take up to 10 points. Once all four group members have made their decisions, 
the points remaining in the common project are calculated and multiplied by an efficiency factor of 
2, then redistributed among all group members.  In this treatment, the selfish choice is to take 
tokens from the common project into one’s personal account – thus, the cooperative choice is to 
leave tokens in the common project to benefit all participants.  
 Participant i’s payoff is calculated by adding the number of points (in integers up to a 
maximum of 10) taken from the common project to the number of points redistributed to 
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participant i from the contributions left in the common project (scaled up by the efficiency factor) 
after all group members have made their decisions. Formally, i’s payoffs are represented by the 
general and specific payoff functions in equations (3) and (4).  
Equation 3:             
 
 
∑ (      )
 
    
Equation 4:              
 
 
∑ (     )
 
    
 
Where e is the allotted individual endowment, qi is the number of points taken from the common 
project, m is the efficiency factor, and n is the group size. 
  
 As in the “giving” treatment, the dominant strategy in the “taking” frame is to not contribute 
to the common project.  In this treatment condition, this means that the predicted action of 
participant i is to take the maximum number of points allowed (10) from the common project.  
Since all points left in the common project are redistributed evenly (after being scaled up by the 
efficiency factor), participant i can maximize his or her profits by taking the maximum number of 
points and free-riding on the contributions of others. The collective optimal action is to leave all 
points in the common project, in order to maximize the social return of the public good (group 
payoff). The profit function – and thus optimal strategies – are symmetric for all group members.  
2.1.3  Part 3 – Risk Assessment 
 
In Part 3, participants complete a risk assessment survey in which they must choose 
between two paired lottery choices for each decision: Lottery A and Lottery B.  The payoffs in 
Lottery A are less variable than those in Lottery B – but if one “wins” the lottery in Lottery B, he or 
she stands to gain much higher payoffs than those possible in Lottery A.  In the first decision row, 
there is only a 1/10 probability of receiving the higher payoff in both lottery choices. Thus, a highly 
risk-loving participant would select Lottery B and a highly risk-averse participant would always 
select Lottery A for the first decision row.  In each subsequent row, the probability of receiving the 
higher payoff (in both lottery options) increases, until in the 10th and final decision the probability 
of receiving the higher payoff is 1 in both options.  Since the higher payoff in Lottery B is 15.4 points 
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and the higher payoff in Lottery A is only 8 points, even the most risk-averse participant should 
select Lottery B in the 10th decision.   
 Participants make all 10 lottery choice decisions on the same screen after being read 
instructions and a short example explaining the setup of the task.  Prior to indicating their 
preferences, participants are told that only one choice will be selected at random after the 
completion of the survey and that lottery will be conducted to determine payoffs.  
Table 1: The Ten Paired Lottery Choice Decisions and their Expected Payoffs 
 






1/10 of 8.00, 
9/10 of 6.40 
1/10 of 15.40, 







2/10 of 8.00, 
8/10 of 6.40 
2/10 of 15.40, 







3/10 of 8.00, 
7/10 of 6.40 
3/10 of 15.40, 







4/10 of 8.00, 
6/10 of 6.40 
4/10 of 15.40, 







5/10 of 8.00, 
5/10 of 6.40 
5/10 of 15.40, 







6/10 of 8.00, 
4/10 of 6.40 
6/10 of 15.40, 







7/10 of 8.00, 
3/10 of 6.40 
7/10 of 15.40, 







8/10 of 8.00, 
2/10 of 6.40 
8/10 of 15.40, 







9/10 of 8.00, 
1/10 of 6.40 
9/10 of 15.40, 







10/10 of 8.00, 
0/10 of 6.40 
10/10 of 15.40, 









 Table 1 shows the paired lottery choices as well as expected payoffs associated with each 
option3.  The fifth column shows the difference in expected payoffs from Lotteries A and B (shown 
individually in columns 3 and 4).  This table illustrates that with the selected payoffs, the risk 
neutral choice pattern is AAAABBBBBB. Thus, we would expect a risk-neutral participant who 
selects between lotteries A and B on the basis of expected payoffs alone to select Lottery A in the 
                                                          




first four decisions (where the expected payoff of A is higher than that of B) and to select Lottery B 
in the final six decisions (where the expected payoff of B is higher than that of A).  By comparing the 
“crossover point” – or the decision choice at which participant i begins to prefer Lottery B to 
Lottery A – in a participant’s response form to this expected risk-neutral decision pattern, we can 
assess whether participant i is risk-averse, risk-loving, or risk-neutral. We estimate coefficients of 
constant relative risk aversion using the method used by Holt and Laury (2002)4.  We use these 
estimations to control for subject’s risk aversion in our analysis. 
2.2 Experimental Procedures and Data 
 
Twelve experimental sessions were run at the Harvard Decision Sciences Laboratory 
(HDSL) in Cambridge, MA between February and March 2014. Data from eleven of these sessions is 
included here5. Participants were recruited online through the HDSL study pool and were paid a 
$10 show-up fee plus their experimental earnings at an exchange rate of one experimental point to 
ten cents. A total of 120 subjects participated in this experiment, interacting in groups of 8 to 16 
depending on lab availability and show-up rates. The experiment lasted approximately 60 minutes 
and participants were not allowed to communicate with one another through the entirety of the 
experiment. Experimental sessions were approved by the Wellesley College Institutional Review 
Board.  
Written informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to the start of the 
experiment. After providing consent, participants were seated in front of individual computers and 
provided with a brief introduction to the experiment. Instructions for Part 1 were read aloud and 
appeared onscreen and participants completed a brief quiz designed to test their comprehension of 
                                                          
4 Holt and Laury (2002) assess relative risk aversion by considering the crossover point at which an 
individual selects a higher risk option over a lower risk option.  Lottery choices are constructed such that 
there is an identifiable risk neutral choice pattern to serve as a comparison.  
5 Data from the twelfth session is omitted from this analysis due to a technical error which forced the 
experimenters to end the session before completing the experiment. Participants in this session were paid the 
$10 show-up fee and were not eligible to participate in future experimental sessions.  
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the experimental design prior to the start of Part 1.  After Part 1, the instructions for Part 2 were 
read aloud and appeared on the computer screen. Participants were reminded that their actions in 
Part 1 would not influence Part 2 prior to the start of Part 2. After the completion of Part 2, 
instructions for Part 3 were read aloud and appeared onscreen. After finishing Part 3, participants 
completed a brief demographic questionnaire. All participants were paid in cash at the end of the 
experimental session.     
 
The number of participants per treatment condition is as follows: weak-giving, 32; weak-
taking, 28; strong-giving, 28; and strong-taking, 32. The participant pool is 67% female; 92% of 
participants are Boston-area graduate or undergraduate students; and the mean subject age is 23 
years. Mean experimental earnings were $18, including the $10 show-up fee. Summary statistics 













Table 2: Summary Statistics           
VARIABLES Observations Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
Female 120 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Age 114 23.34 6.66 18 58 
Years in US (if not born in US)6 12 9.67 5.72 3 20 
      Student 120 0.92 2775.00 0 1 
Undergraduate 120 0.79 0.41 0 1 
GPA 106 3.52 0.32 2.7 4 
HHIncome under $20,000 112 0.18 0.38 0 1 
HHIncome $20,000- $45,000 112 0.13 0.34 0 1 
HHIncome $45,000- $65,000 112 0.11 0.31 0 1 
HHIncome $65,000- $90,000 112 0.13 0.33 0 1 
HHIncome $90,000- $125,000 112 0.13 0.33 0 1 
HHIncome $125,000- $200,000 112 0.19 0.39 0 1 
HHIncome over $200,000  112 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Charity 100 529.50 2558.90 0 25,000 
White 120 0.57 0.50 0 1 
Hispanic 120 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Black 120 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Asian 120 0.20 0.40 0 1 
American Indian/Alaskan 120 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Risk Averse 108 0.43 0.50 0 1 
Risk Loving 108 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Risk Neutral 108 0.19 0.40 0 1 
Very Risk Averse 108 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Very Risk Loving 108 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Never Married 120 0.94 0.24 0 1 
Married 120 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Separated 120 0.01 0.09 0 1 






                                                          
6 88% of participants are US citizens. Other countries of citizenship in the sample include Canada, Chile, 




3. Empirical Strategy 
 To analyze the effects of exposure to different institutions and framing on cooperative 
behavior, we first consider each effect separately and then look at the interaction between the two.  
Thus, we look at not only the differences between our four main experimental conditions (strong-
give, strong-take, weak-give, weak-take), but also the differences in cooperation rates between 
strong and weak institutions (irrespective of subsequent frame) and in cooperation in the public 
goods game when it is framed as taking versus giving.   
 Since we run a controlled laboratory experiment, our main analysis is a comparison of 
means and medians. In addition, we run a series of regression specifications in order to include 
additional controls in our analysis.  
In Part 1, cooperation is defined as the number of rounds in which participant i makes the 
socially optimal choice (Option A) divided by 30, the total number of rounds played.  
    
                                    
  
 
  ∑   
 
   
 
 
We also separately consider cooperation in the first five and last five rounds to distinguish 
whether the preference towards defection or cooperation has changed as a result of the game. 
There are two potential effects which could bias participants’ decisions in later rounds of the 
experiment, both of which are accounted for in our experimental design.  As participants accrue 
earnings over rounds, income effects could potentially influence decisions later in the experiment. 
To address this issue, we randomly select one round to use in calculating experimental payoffs.  The 
second potential biasing effect arises due to the fact that participants are aware that they are 
approaching the final round of the experiment and that the remaining rounds represent a small 
fraction of those which could be randomly selected for payment. This could lead them to be less 
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concerned about the outcome of their decision, potentially leading to additional noise.  For this 
reason, participants are not aware of the total number of rounds played or the number of rounds 
remaining at any given time.   
In Part 2, cooperation is measured in two ways.  First, we consider the number of 
experimental points participant i contributes to the common project.  Second, we consider the 
percentage of participants who free-rode on the contributions of other group members in each 
session. In analyzing the interaction between the two treatments – institutions and framing – we 
compare contributions in Part 2 across the four distinct treatment conditions described earlier.  
 Finally, we use regression analysis to control for any individual or group-level differences 
which could potentially influence our results, perform further analysis beyond comparisons of 
means, and to test for significance. We first estimate the relationship between cooperation in Part 1 
and institutional condition using a simple Ordinary Least Squares model.  
CooperationRatei = β0 + β1StrongInstitutioni +   
 γ + εi  (1) 
where i represents the individual participant and CooperationRatei is the percentage of rounds in 
which he or she chooses option A, the socially optimal or “cooperative” choice.  The primary 
explanatory variable, StrongInstitution, is a dummy variable which captures whether or not the 
participant is randomly assigned to the strong institution condition in Part 1.   
 
 is a vector of 
individual characteristics, including gender, age, marital status, race, student, field of study, GPA, 
level of relative risk aversion, household income, and charity donations. We also run a related 
specification in which we include interaction terms between StrongInstitution and Female, Risk 
Averse, Risk Loving, Very Risk Averse, and Very Risk Loving. Including these interaction terms allows 
us to assess whether the impact of exposure to a strong institution is different for males and 
females, and participants with different levels of relative risk aversion.  
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 We next consider the effect of learning on cooperation over the course of Part 1. Specifically, 
we estimate the relationship between being in the strong institution condition and the magnitude 
of the difference in CooperationRatei in rounds 26-30 (last five rounds of Part 1) and in rounds 1-5.  
CooperationDifferencei = β0 + β1StrongInstitutioni +  
 γ + εi  (2) 
Where CooperationDifferencei is the difference in participant i’s mean cooperation rate in the last 
five rounds of the experiment (26-30) and the first five rounds (1-5) and is constructed by 
subtracting variables representing these two independent cooperation rates.  Here the coefficient 
β1 captures the effect of learning over the course of the experiment (between the first five and last 
five rounds) and thus tells us how much of the total cooperation observed at the end of the 
experiment can be attributed to learning.   
 In order to isolate the effect of framing, we estimate the relationship between cooperation 
in Part 2 (contributions to the public good) and the taking frame treatment.  
PGCooperationLeveli = β0 + β1Takingi +  
 γ + εi  (3) 
where PGCooperationLeveli represents the number of experimental points participant i contributes 
to the common project (out of a maximum of 10).  More specifically, for a participant in the giving 
frame treatment, PGCooperationLeveli is equal to the number of experimental points i chooses to 
give to the common project.  Conversely, for a participant in the taking frame treatment, it is equal 
to the number of experimental points i chooses to leave in the common project. Takingi describes 
whether participant i is randomly assigned to the taking frame treatment in Part 2 of the 
experiment, and  
  is the vector of individual characteristics.  
 We also consider the impact of framing on cooperation in Part 2 by estimating the 
relationship between free riding and being in the taking frame by running a probit regression.  
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FreeRideri = β0 + β1Takingi +   
 γ + εi  (4) 
where FreeRideri represents the probability that individual i will choose to free-ride on the 
contributions of others.  Here we define free-riding as contributing nothing to the common project; 
thus, for participants in the giving frame treatment, free-riding is defined as keeping all 10 
experimental points in one’s private account, while for participants in the taking frame treatment it 
is defined as taking all 10 experimental points out of the common project.  
 In both the giving and taking frame treatments participants are presented with a default 
option. In the giving frame, the default is to keep all of one’s experimental points in their private 
account while in the taking frame it is to contribute fully to the common project.  In order to analyze 
whether there is any effect of default bias in participants’ decisions, we run a probit model 
estimating the relationship between the probability of taking action against the status quo and 
being in the taking frame in Part 2.  
Actioni = β0 + β1Takingi +  
 γ + εi  (5) 
where Actioni is the probability that participant i takes action against the status quo.  For 
participants in the giving treatment, this means that participant i chooses to give some (or all) of 
their points to the common project.  In the taking frame, Actioni is defined as the opposite: as taking 
from the common project and into one’s private account.  
 Finally, we consider the interaction between institutions and framing on cooperation in Part 
2 of the experiment. We estimate specifications (3) through (5) again, this time including 
categorical dummy variables for each unique treatment condition (strong-giving, strong-taking, 
weak-taking)7. The coefficients on each of these variables describe the relationship between being 
                                                          
7 Weak-giving is the omitted category in our regression specifications.  
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in one of four unique treatment conditions and cooperation in Part 2, free-riding, and taking action 
against the status quo, respectively.  
PGCooperationLeveli = β0 +β1StrongGivingi + β2StrongTakingi   (6) 
+ β3WeakTakingi +  
 γ + εi 
 
FreeRideri = β0 + β1StrongGivingi + β2StrongTakingi + β4StrongTakingi (7) 
+ β5WeakTakingi +  
 γ + εi 
 
Actioni = β0 + β1StrongGivingi + β2StrongTakingi + β3SWeakTakingi (8) 
+   
 γ + εi 
 
 
 We are unable to include session fixed effects in our regression models due to perfect 
collinearity between the session a participant is in and the treatment condition which he or she is 
exposed to (since only one unique treatment is run in each experimental session).  Session-level 
characteristics can only be controlled for if we run separate regressions within each treatment 
condition; we do not conduct this analysis due to the small sample size within each treatment 
condition.  Instead, we include date fixed effects, which allow us to control for differences across 
months and between days of the week. Although date fixed effects do not allow us to control for as 
much variation as session fixed effects would, they allow us to capture a significant portion of any 
















4.1 The Effect of Exposure to Institutions on Cooperation 
 
We consider the effect of exposure to strong and weak institutions on cooperation in  
two ways.  First, we consider overall cooperation (C) during Part 1.  
4.1.1 Overall Cooperation 
  
 Consistent with our predictions, participants exposed to the strong institution treatment 
cooperate substantially more than participants exposed to the weak treatment condition (Figure 5). 
The average overall cooperation rate in the strong institution condition is 0.93 – participants make 
the socially optimal choice of Option A 93% of the time.  This is more than two and half times 
greater than the average cooperation rate of 0.36, or 36% in the weak institution condition.  
 
Figure 5: Average overall cooperation rate by treatment condition.  Error bars indicate the 95% 
confidence interval. Mean: 0.93, std. error: 0.015 (strong); mean: 0.36, std. error: 0.033 (weak) 
 
 
 The difference in mean overall contribution rates between the strong and weak institution 
conditions illustrated in Figure 5 is confirmed by running a linear regression with the cooperation 





























interest. There is significantly more cooperation in the strong institution condition than in the weak 
institution condition (p<0.01).  
Specifically, our basic specification results in Table 3 (specification 2) indicate that an 
individual randomly assigned to the strong institution condition will have an expected overall 
cooperation rate 62 percentage points higher than an individual in the weak institution condition.  
This supports our hypothesis that a strong institution generates more cooperation than a weak 
institution.  
 In order to test whether certain groups of individuals are more sensitive to exposure to 
institutions than others, we repeat this specification but include additional variables interacting 
certain demographic controls with the strong institution variable.  Specifically, we generate four 
interaction terms: stronginstitutionxfemale, which captures the interaction between institutions and 
gender; and three variables capturing the interaction between institutions and risk preference 
types. In Specification (2) the coefficient on the main explanatory variable, strong institution, 
remains constant in magnitude and highly significant (p<0.01). 
 Coefficients on all four interaction terms are not statistically significant, suggesting that the 
way in which individuals’ cooperative behavior responds to institutional exposure does not vary 
with his or her gender or risk preference (not shown). There is, however, a significant effect of 
being risk averse on cooperation in Part 1 of the experiment (p=0.012). Specifically, results show 
that an individual who is risk averse will have an expected overall cooperation rate 25 percentage 
points higher than an individual who is risk neutral. We can tell a simple story to explain this result: 
a risk-averse individual will want to minimize the risk of receiving 0% of their raw payoff if audited 
during a given round.  Thus, we would expect them to choose Option A (cooperate) with a higher 
probability, since participants who select Option A receive 100% of their raw payoff for the round 
regardless of whether they are audited, minimizing their risk of losing payoff if audited. 
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Table 3: Overall Cooperation Rates in Part 1 
    (1) (2) (3) 
        
Strong Institution 0.575*** 0.617*** 0.616*** 
 












































   
(0.151) 
    Observations 120 80 80 
R-squared 0.683 0.844 0.856 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   Additional Controls: Female, Age, Never Married, Married, Hispanic, Black, Asian, Native 
American/Alaskan, Student, Undergraduate, GPA, HHIncome $20,000- $45,000, HHIncome $45,000- 
$65,000, HHIncome $65,000- $90,000, HHIncome $90,000- $125,000, HHIncome $125,000- 
$200,000, HHIncome over $200,000, Charity 
    
The results in Table 3 show that exposure to externally created institutions has a large and 
statistically significant impact on social decision-making. We next consider the effect of learning 
during the experiment on cooperation rates.   
 
4.1.2 Learning and Cooperation over Time  
 
We look at cooperation rates specifically within the first five and last five rounds of Part 1 in 
order to gauge whether there is any learning taking place over the course of Part 1. In particular, it 
is possible that some participants’ previous preferences inform their initial decisions despite the 
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experimenters’ efforts to give them clear instructions.  However, these participants may learn to 
behave differently after the first few rounds of the experiment, reflecting their increased 
understanding of the experimental parameters. In order to assess the rate at which learning takes 
place, we also plot the cooperation rate in each individual round over the 30 round experiment.  
 Figure 6 shows that participants in the strong condition cooperate more than those in the 
weak condition at both the beginning and end of the experiment, and that cooperation increases 
over time for participants in the strong condition and decreases over time for participants in the 
weak condition.  This indicates that, in addition to the immediate effect of our institutional 
treatments on behavior there is substantial learning over time and the effect becomes stronger with 
this learning.  
 
 
Figure 6: Average cooperation rate in first five and last five rounds by treatment condition.  Error 
bars indicate the 95% confidence interval. Rounds 1-5 – mean: 0.82, std. error: 0.031 (strong); mean: 
0.52, std. error: 0.043 (weak). Rounds 26-30 – mean: 0.97, std. error: 0.014 (strong); mean: 0.29, std. 
error: 0.04 (weak) 
 
The difference in mean contributions for rounds 1-5 is statistically significant (p=0.019) and 
confirms that even at the beginning of the experiment participants respond to the two different 


























observed increase in cooperation in the strong condition over time support our hypothesis that 
exposure to a weak institution will negatively affect cooperation and that exposure to a strong 
institution will encourage cooperative behavior.  These trends are illustrated in Table 4 and are also 
statistically significant (p<0.01).  
Table 4: Learning and Cooperation in Part 1 
   (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Rounds 1-5 Rounds 26-30 Difference 
        
Strong Institution 0.290** 0.652*** 0.363*** 
 
(0.119) (0.0823) (0.111) 
Female -0.0405 -0.0347 0.00579 
 
(0.121) (0.0833) (0.112) 
StrongInstitutionxFemale 0.118 0.0766 -0.0412 
 
(0.165) (0.114) (0.153) 
Risk Averse 0.299** 0.129 -0.170 
 
(0.114) (0.0786) (0.106) 
Risk Loving 0.180 -0.122 -0.301 
 
(0.202) (0.139) (0.188) 
Very Risk Averse 0.211 0.0506 -0.160 
 
(0.131) (0.0905) (0.122) 
Very Risk Loving 0.292 0.310 0.0183 
 
(0.271) (0.187) (0.252) 
    Observations 80 80 80 
R-squared 0.496 0.838 0.495 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   Additional Controls: Age, Never Married, Married, Student, Undergraduate, GPA, HHIncome $20,000- 
$45,000, HHIncome $45,000- $65,000, HHIncome $65,000- $90,000, HHIncome $90,000- $125,000, 
HHIncome $125,000- $200,000, HHIncome over $200,000, Charity 
 
 The total impact of institutional exposure on cooperation by the end of Part 1 is captured by 
the coefficient on strong institution in specification (2). Since the coefficient on strong institution in 
specification (3) is just under half the magnitude of the coefficient in specification (2) (0.363 and 
0.652, respectively), we conclude that approximately half of the difference in cooperation by the 
end of Part 1 is explained by learning while the other half is explained by immediate understanding 
of the instructions (and is thus reflected in behavior in rounds 1-5).  
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 Including demographic controls in our regression specification allows us to consider the 
differential effects of learning (captured by the difference in average cooperation rates in rounds 
26-30 and 1-5) among different groups as well as the interaction between institutional condition 
and certain demographic characteristics.  Like in our analysis of overall cooperation, we find no 
significant effect of the interaction between gender or risk preference and being in the strong 
institution condition, although there is a significant relationship between risk preference and 
learning.   
Specification (1) finds a significant positive effect of being risk averse on cooperation rates 
in the first five rounds of Part 1 (p=0.011). The coefficient on risk averse in not significant in 
specification (2) and reverses direction and is not statistically significant in specification (3). This 
indicates that while we expect risk averse individuals to cooperate at a higher rate at the beginning 
of Part 1, risk averse individuals are not more likely to learn at a faster or different rate than risk 
neutral individuals and we do not expect their cooperation rates by the end of Part 1 to differ 
significantly from those of risk neutral participants.  
 The results in Table 4 suggest that learning through repeated exposure to external 
institutions makes differences in cooperation rates even stronger on top of the initial effect on 
cooperative behavior.  In order to assess how quickly learning takes place, we plot the cooperation 
rate in each individual round over the course of Part 1 (Figure 7).  
 As expected based on the results in Table 4, the average cooperation rate in Round 1 is 
statistically significantly higher for participants exposed to the strong institution condition than for 
those exposed to the weak institution condition. Figure 7 clearly illustrates the stark divergence of 
cooperation rates over the course of Part 1; while cooperation rates increase gradually for 
participants in the strong institution condition, cooperation in the weak institution condition drops 
dramatically and almost immediately. It is interesting to note that while cooperation rates increase 
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fairly steadily in the strong institution condition, movement in the cooperation rate over the 30 
rounds is much less regular in the weak institution condition.  Specifically, cooperation appears to 
be almost cyclical in nature; falling dramatically, then increasing again. This pattern could be 
attributed to participant perceptions of the behavior of their partner or could reflect the fact that an 
institution designed to elicit uncooperative behavior is inconsistent with participants’ 












Figure 7: Average cooperation rate plotted against round number by treatment condition.  
 The analysis of Part 1 behavior shows that external institutions have a strong influence on 
cooperation and behavior in a social dilemma. Next, we analyze the results of Part 2, focusing on the 
effect of the interaction between institutional history and framing on cooperative behavior within 





































4.2  The Effect of Framing on Contributions to a Public Good 
 
In order to isolate the effect of framing we first consider differences in cooperation within 
strong or weak institution treatments from Part 1. We then extend our analysis to assess the degree 
of interaction between framing and institutional exposure by comparing contributions across all 
four unique treatment conditions in later subsections. We define full cooperation as the socially 
optimal decision of contributing the maximum number of points to the common project.    
 
4.2.1 Overall Cooperation Levels in “Taking” and “Giving” Games 
 
Among participants assigned to the strong institution condition in Part 1 of the  
experiment, cooperation levels in Part 2 are slightly higher when the public goods decision is 
framed as whether or not to take from the common project.  The average cooperation level, or 
number of points contributed to the common project, is 3.79 in the giving treatment and 4.35 in the 
taking treatment.  For participants assigned to the weak institution condition in Part 1, the effect of 
framing on cooperation is opposite in direction: the mean number of points contributed to the 
common project by participants in the giving treatment is 4.75, whereas the mean number of points 






Figure 8: Mean cooperation level in giving and taking treatments for participants exposed to strong 
and weak institutions. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval. Strong Institution – mean: 
3.79, std. error: 0.708 (giving); mean: 4.35, std. error: 0.859 (taking). Weak Institution – mean: 4.75, 
std. error: 0.678 (giving); mean: 3.68, std. error: 0.828 (taking).  
 
 In both groups (strong and weak institutions), the difference in mean cooperation levels 
between the taking and giving conditions is small in magnitude (0.56 in the strong institution 
condition; 1.07 in the weak institution condition). The standard errors around the means are also 
relatively high.  This suggests that the mean cooperation level may not accurately reflect the 
dispersion of cooperation levels in each treatment.  Figure 9 shows the median cooperation level 
for each treatment, within institutional condition. Comparing median contributions across 
treatments provides more information about the dispersion or skew of cooperation than the means 






















































Figure 9: Median cooperation level in giving and taking treatments for participants exposed to 




The median cooperation level for participants exposed to a weak institution in the giving 
treatment is 5 points.  In contrast, the median contribution in the taking condition is 0.5 points.  The 
difference in median cooperation level between treatments is equally striking for participants in 
the strong institution condition.  In the giving treatment, there is a median cooperation level of 3.5 
points. The taking treatment, on the other hand, results in a median cooperation level of 0 points.   
 The low median cooperation levels in the taking treatment do not mean that contributions 
to the public good are non-existent (as confirmed by Figure 8).  Instead, they suggest that almost 
half (in the weak institution) and more than half (in the strong institution) of participants do not 
contribute to the common project.  Thus, Figure 9 captures the substantial skew in cooperation 
level not reflected in Figure 8.  
 Despite the differences in mean and median cooperation noted above, we find no 
statistically significant effect of framing on contributions to the public good in our regression 
analysis (Table 5).  One possible explanation for this is the similar patterns of contribution 



















































contribute either 0 or 10 points to the common project, with a small but notable minority 
contributing 5 points (Figure 10).  Similar patterns of contribution and small differences in mean 
contributions (Figure 8) seem to suggest that the differences observed might not be explained by 
the way in which the game is framed.  We note, however, that the standard error on our frame 
coefficient is relatively large (3.54)and that the lack of significance could potentially be attributed 
to noise due to the small number of observations in each treatment (28 participants in weak-taking 
and strong-giving; 32 participants in weak-giving and strong-taking).  
 
Figure 10: Frequency distribution of cooperation levels for participants in the strong institution 
condition (left panel) and weak institution condition (right panel).  
 
 
Table 5 shows the results of our regression analysis.  Although the coefficient on the  
taking frame is not statistically significant, as described above, the coefficient on the interaction 
between the taking frame and female variables is significant (p=0.036) as is the coefficient on the 
interaction term takingframexriskloving (p=0.049).  The number of participants captured by the 
takingframexriskloving interaction is very small (2 participants), so we do not focus on this result. 
Instead, we focus on the interaction between framing and gender and its implication below.  
 We find that there is a significant effect of the interaction of the taking frame and female 
dummy variables.  Specifically, the coefficient on takingframexfemale captures the difference in the 






















marginal effect of being male and in the taking treatment is -3.45; we would expect a male in the 
taking treatment to contribute 3.45 experimental points less to the common project relative to the 
giving frame. The marginal effect of being in the taking frame for women is estimated to be 1.33 – 
that is, we would expect a female in the taking treatment to contribute a little over one 
experimental point more to the common project than a female in the giving treatment. This 
suggests that females may react differently to the framing of a decision than men, and in particular, 
that they may be more sensitive to framing a public goods decision as “taking” instead of “giving”.  
Table 5: Cooperation in the Public Goods Game (Part 2) 
  (1) 
VARIABLES PG Contribution 
    


















  Observations 80 
R-squared 0.498 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Additional Controls: Age, Never Married, Married, Student, Hispanic, Black, Asian, Native American/Alaskan, 
TakingFramexRiskAverse, TakingFramexRiskLoving, TakingFramexRiskNeutral, 
TakingFramexVeryRiskAverse, HHIncome $20,000- $45,000, HHIncome $45,000- $65,000, HHIncome 




4.2.2 Framing and the Decision to Free-Ride  
 
In addition to our analysis of contributions, we also consider rates of free-riding as a 
measure of extreme antisocial behavior in the public goods game.  Here, we focus on “full free-
riding,” or the individually profit-maximizing decision to contribute 0 points to the common project. 
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Across both frame conditions a total of 40% of participants free-ride on the contributions of others 
(Figure 11) in Part 2 of the experiment. This represents a substantial proportion of the overall 
subject pool, and thus is of great interest.  
In the giving treatment free-riding is still substantial, but occurs at a lower rate than in the 
taking treatment. This result is inconsistent with our initial hypothesis and quite surprising; free-
riding in the taking condition, by actively taking points from the common project, should be more 
psychologically difficult than free-riding by simply not contributing in the giving condition – thus, 
we would expect to see the opposite pattern.  
 
Figure 11: Free-rider rate in giving and taking treatments for participants exposed to strong and 
weak institutions. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval. Strong Institution – giving: 0.36; 
taking: 0.53. Weak Institution – giving: 0.22; taking: 0.50 
 
 
 The difference in free-rider rates by framing condition is statistically significant in our 
baseline specification with demographic controls (Table 6).  We run a probit model in order to 
determine the effect of framing on the probability that one will free-ride and find that being in the 
taking frame treatment statistically significantly increases the probability that a participant will 

























Table 6: Marginal Effects on Probability of Free-Riding in the Public Goods Game (Part 2) 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES freerider Freerider 
      
Taking Frame 0.660* 1.499 
 
(0.370) (0.965) 








Hispanic 1.611*** 1.003 
 
(0.593) (0.709) 
Black 0.0572 -0.537 
 
(0.491) (0.559) 
Asian 0.0323 0.0197 
 
(0.468) (0.504) 
   Other Controls? Yes Yes 
   Observations 75 72 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  Additional Controls: Age, Never Married, Undergraduate, GPA, TakingFramexRiskAverse, 
TakingFramexRiskLoving, TakingFramexVeryRiskAverse, HHIncome $20,000- $45,000, HHIncome 
$45,000- $65,000, HHIncome $65,000- $90,000, HHIncome $90,000- $125,000, HHIncome $125,000- 
$200,000, HHIncome over $200,000, Charity 
 
We run a second specification in which we include additional controls, specifically 
interaction terms between the taking frame and risk aversion and female variables.  Just like in our 
analysis of Part 2 cooperation levels, here we find a statistically significant effect of the interaction 
between the taking frame and being female (p=0.002).  Specifically, there is a negative relationship 
between this interaction term and the probability of free-riding.  
4.2.3  Free-Riding and Status Quo Bias 
Finally, we consider the role of the status quo and default bias (Samuelson & Zekhauser, 
1988) on decision making in the two frames. Although we are limited in our ability to test for status 
quo bias due to the confounding effect of our frame treatment, we run a probit regression with the 
probability of taking action against the status quo as our dependent variable. We run this 
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regression to see whether we can find any evidence of an effect of status quo bias in participants’ 
decisions in the public goods game. 
Each of our two treatments presents subjects with a default option; thus we predict that 
there may be a status quo bias in these two treatments. In the giving frame, free-riding on the 
contributions of others is the default – unless a participant actively chooses to contribute to the 
common project, all their points will remain in their private account.  In the taking treatment the 
default is to leave all 10 of one’s points in the common project (i.e., the default is to contribute). The 
results in Table 7 show that participants in the taking treatment are statistically significantly more 
likely to free-ride on the contributions of others in Part 2 – that is, that they have an increased 
probability of acting against the status quo. Conversely, we can observe that participants in the 
giving frame treatment are less likely to free-ride than participants in the taking frame treatment – 
again, this requires action against the status quo, in this case to actively contribute to the common 
project.  
This result goes against our initial hypothesis, that participants in the taking frame 
treatment will contribute more and free-ride at a lower rate than participants in the giving frame 
treatment.  In fact, we find that there is a significant and positive effect of being in the taking frame 
treatment on the probability of taking action against the status quo (p=0.022), indicating that a 
participant in the taking frame treatment is more likely to take action against the status quo (by 
taking from the common project) than a participant in the giving frame is (by giving to the common 






Table 7: Marginal Effects on Probability of Action Against the Status Quo in Part 2 
  (1) 
VARIABLES Action 
    





















Risk Averse 1.642** 
 
(0.753) 
Risk Loving  -0.210 
 
(1.063) 









  Other Controls?  Yes 
  Observations 73 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Additional Controls: Student, Undergraduate, GPA, HHIncome $20,000- $45,000, HHIncome $45,000- 
$65,000, HHIncome $65,000- $90,000, HHIncome $90,000- $125,000, HHIncome $125,000- 
$200,000, HHIncome over $200,000, Charity 
 
Additionally, the coefficients on a number of demographic variables of interest are 
statistically significant. The coefficients on both female and age are statistically significant, 
suggesting that the likelihood of an individual taking action against the status quo varies across 
these demographic characteristics.  Specifically we find a negative relationship between being 
female and the probability of taking action against the default option (p = 0.063); this marginal 
effect indicates that women are more susceptible to status quo bias than men.  We also find a 
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negative relationship between age and the probability of taking action (p=0.054); however, we do 
not focus on this result since our sample is quite young (mean=23 years; standard deviation=6.6 
years). 
 The coefficients on two of our racial controls, Hispanic and Asian,  are also statistically 
significant and positive in magnitude, indicating that individuals from certain racial backgrounds 
are more likely to take action against the status quo than White participants (Hispanic: p=0.008; 
Asian: p=0.058). We also find significant positive relationships between being risk averse and very 
risk averse and the probability of taking action against the status quo (p=0.029 and p=0.009, 
respectively), suggesting that risk aversion impacts an individual’s propensity to take action against 
the status quo.  
 The results in Table 7 are inconsistent with our predictions regarding the impact of status 
quo bias on behavior in our frame treatments.  While we would expect individuals in the taking 
treatment to contribute at a higher level to the common project and free-ride at a lower rate (since 
the default option is to contribute) and that individuals in the giving treatment would be more 
likely to free ride (since the default option is to not contribute), we do not find evidence of such an 
effect.  This could potentially suggest that the impact of the status quo bias is less salient in the 
decision making of participants than we expected or that other motivations influencing 
participants’ decisions whether or not to contribute influence their decisions more.  It could also 
reflect the fact that we are not adequately able to capture any effect of a status quo bias due to the 
confounding factor of our treatment frames.  
 The above analysis indicates that while there is a significant effect of framing on free-riding, 
we are unable to draw a causal link to support the observed difference in cooperation levels 
between frames in Part 2. Further, we do not see a statistically significant relationship between 
framing and the probability of taking action. However, comparison of means – our main analysis 
tool – coupled with regression analysis to include additional controls suggests that there is an 
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impact of framing on cooperation in the public goods game, specifically with respect to the decision 
whether to free ride or not.  Now that we have established a basis to believe that there could be a 
framing effect, we focus on the interaction between framing and institutions – do different 
institutions respond differently to framing?  
 
4.3  The Interaction of Framing and Institutions 
In order to assess the presence and the extent of the interaction between framing and 
institutions, we reanalyze the results from Part 2 of the experiment, this time focusing on the 
variation between participants exposed to strong and weak institutions in Part 1. Specifically, we 
consider the impact of being in one of the four unique treatment groups on behavior.  
 
4.3.1 The Impact of Institutions and Framing on Cooperation in the Public 
Goods Game 
 
A simple comparison of means shows that the effect of being exposed to a strong  
or weak institution in Part 1 of the experiment on cooperation in Part 2 appears ambiguous 
(Figures 8 and 9). The ambiguity of these descriptive statistics reflects the fact that the difference in 
total contributions to the common project for participants exposed to the strong and weak 
institutions in Part 1 is extremely small (13 points). Participants exposed to the weak institution 
condition in Part 1 contribute a total of 255 experimental points to the common project in Part 2, 
regardless of frame treatment; participants exposed to the strong institution condition in Part 1 
contribute just slightly less, a total of 242 experimental points.  
Although the difference in contributions to the public good between institutional conditions 
is small, it is statistically significant (Table 8).  We find that a participant exposed to the strong 
institution condition in Part 1 of the experiment has an expected contribution in Part 2 of almost 8 
points less than one exposed to the weak institution condition (p=0.035). It is important to note 
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that this result is for all participants in the strong institution condition, regardless of frame 
treatment in Part 2.  
This result is inconsistent with our findings in Part 1, which show a positive relationship 
between exposure to a strong institution and cooperation, and suggest that institutional conditions 
established in Part 1 might not be salient enough to impact behavior in Part 2 of the experiment.  
One reason why this might be is that there is a break in play between Parts 1 and 2. Between the 
two treatments, participants receive new instructions, which could provide enough time for 
participants to revert back to their preexisting attitudes regarding cooperation.  Another 
explanation for this result relates to the feedback provided to participants at the end of Part 1.   
After the final round of play, one round of the 30 played is randomly selected to determine 
experimental payoffs.  This method is employed in order to prevent income effects.  A secondary 
effect, however, might be that telling participants their score causes them to shift focus away from 
learned cooperation and onto the outcome of the randomly selected round.  Take for example a 
participant i in the strong institution condition who successfully learns to cooperate over the course 
of Part 1. If in the randomly selected round i receives 0 points, then the disappointment and 
potentially selfish motivation to earn points elicited by the result feedback might overpower the 
learned cooperative attitude. Furthermore, for a participant in i’s situation, the poor outcome at the 
end of Part 1 could even potentially cause resentment, leading participants to act even more 









Table 8: The Impact of Interacting Framing and Institutions on Cooperation in The Public 
Goods Game 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES PG Contribution PG Contribution 
      
Part 1 Cooperation -5.221 -2.824 
 
(5.384) (5.397) 
Part 1 Total Points8 0.0835** 0.0745 
 
(0.0395) (0.0465) 






























   Additional Controls? Yes Yes 
   Observations 80 80 
R-squared 0.469 0.372 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Additional Controls: Age, Never Married, Married, White, Hispanic, Black, Asian, Student, 
Undergraduate, TakingFramexStudent, Risk Averse, Risk Loving, Very Risk Averse, Very Risk 
Loving, TakingFramexRiskAverse, TakingFramexRiskLoving, TakingFramexRiskNeutral, 
TakingFramexVeryRiskAverse, GPA, HHIncome $20,000- $45,000, HHIncome $45,000- $65,000, 
HHIncome $65,000- $90,000, HHIncome $90,000- $125,000, HHIncome $125,000- $200,000, 
HHIncome over $200,000, Charity 
 
We also find a significant effect of the number of points earned in Part 1 on cooperation in 
Part 2 (p=0.040). The number of points earned in Part 1 is defined as the sum of all experimental 
point results in rounds 1-30 of Part 1, not the number of points earned in the randomly selected 
round used to calculate experimental earnings. This result suggests that participants who earn 
more in Part 1 (even if they do not get to keep it as experimental earnings) will cooperate at a 
                                                          
8 Total Points is the sum of individual point earnings in rounds 1-30 of Part 1. It is included as a proxy to 
control for any potential wealth or income effect associated with doing well in Part 1 on cooperation in Part 2.  
47 
 
higher rate in Part 2.  However, we must note that the magnitude of this effect is extremely small – 
For a ten point increase in earnings in Part 1, we would only expect an increase in contributions to 
the common project of 0.1 points.  
The results of specification (2) reinforce the above findings. We find a negative and 
statistically significant (p=0.037) coefficient on the strong-giving treatment condition.  This 
suggests that relative to the omitted category (weak-giving), we expect participants in the strong-
giving treatment condition to contribute less to the common project in Part 2.  The magnitude of the 
coefficient here is quite large (9.887), however the standard error is also large (4.608), reflecting 
the skewed pattern of contributions illustrated in Figures 9 and 10. This result could also be biased 
by noise and the small sample size.  
Next, we run a similar specification but estimate the relationship between institutions and 
framing on the probability of free-riding in Part 2 of the experiment (Table 9). Again, we use a 
probit model to assess the impact of our treatment conditions on the probability of free-riding.  We 
find statistically significant coefficients on all three of our unique treatment categorical variables.  
Specifically, we find positive relationships between strong-giving (p=0.006), strong-taking 
(p=0.002), and weak-taking (p=0.008), indicating that relative to the omitted category (weak-
giving), we would expect participants in all three of these unique treatment groups to have a higher 
probability of free-riding on the contributions of others in Part 2 of the experiment. More generally, 
these results confirm that the differences in free-rider rates between treatments (Figure 11) are 








Table 9: Marginal Effects on Probability of Free-Riding by Institution and Frame  
  (1) 
VARIABLES Freerider 
    
Part 1 Cooperation 0.588 
 
(1.632) 





















  Observations 76 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Additional Controls: Female, Age, Married, Never Married, White, Hispanic, Black, Asian, Undergraduate, 
Risk Averse, Risk Loving, Very Risk Averse, Very Risk Loving, HHIncome $20,000- $45,000, HHIncome 
$45,000- $65,000, HHIncome $65,000- $90,000, HHIncome $90,000- $125,000, HHIncome $125,000- 
$200,000, HHIncome over $200,000, Charity  
 
Finally, we replicate our earlier analysis of action and analyze the relationship between 
unique treatment conditions and the probability of taking action against the status quo (Table 10).  
Again, we see highly statistically significant effects on our three unique treatment coefficients 
(strong-giving: p=0.023; strong-taking: p=0.00; weak-taking: p=0.00). We also find strong effects on 
the coefficient for Hispanic (p=0.047). These two sets of results taken together make a compelling 
case for the role of institutions and culture on the probability of taking action against a status quo. 
Specifically, we find that Hispanic individuals and participants in the two taking treatments (strong-
taking, weak-taking) have a higher probability of taking action against the status quo relative to 
White participants or participants in the giving treatment. Between the two giving treatments, 
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being in the strong-giving treatment is associated with a lower probability of taking action, relative 
to the weak-giving treatment.   
Table 10: The Impact of Framing and Institutions on Action Against the Status Quo 
  (1) 
VARIABLES Action 

























  Additional Controls? Yes 
  Observations 75 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Additional Controls: Part 1 Cooperation, Part 1 Points, Student, Undergraduate, TakingxStudent, Risk 
Averse, Risk Loving, Very Risk Averse, GPA, HHIncome $20,000- $45,000, HHIncome $45,000- $65,000, 
HHIncome $65,000- $90,000, HHIncome $90,000- $125,000, HHIncome $125,000- $200,000, HHIncome 














The main results show that institutions, framing, and the interaction of the two have an 
impact on cooperative behavior within the context of social dilemmas. Part 1 of this experiment is 
designed to “prime” participants with the experience of either a strong or weak institution prior to 
participating in a one-shot public goods game social dilemma. The results in Section 5 show that 
Part 1 is successful in eliciting cooperative and uncooperative behavior, depending on the 
institutional condition. However we see a significant negative relationship between being in the 
strong institution condition and cooperation in Part 2.  This result is inconsistent with our 
prediction that participants with a strong institutional history will behave in a more cooperative 
manner in a subsequent social dilemma, and raises questions about the saliency of our treatments 
and the longevity of exposure to an institution required to shape subsequent behavior.  
In particular, it is possible that the separation between Parts 1 and 2 is sufficiently long for 
participants to “forget” their learned institution and revert back to pre-treatment behavior. This 
explanation is supported by the significant impact that demographic factors like race and gender 
have on cooperation levels in Part 2 –suggesting that the cultural norms associated with them may 
be more salient in decision-making than the created institutions in Part 1.  It is unsurprising that 
long-established norms are more salient than institutions quickly created in a laboratory setting. 
Estimating the length of exposure necessary to influence behavior could be an interesting new 
direction for future research in this area.  
Furthermore, while our experiment allows us to observe learning during continued 
exposure to an institution, it does not allow us to analyze why this learning takes place.  Is learning 
over time in Part 1 the result of a greater understanding of the institutional parameters? Is it 
because of developing trust in other participants? Or does learning simply reflect habit formation? 
If learning is the result of habit formation, can we conclude that participants are indeed learning to 
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play the game, or would they make the same decisions even if the other participant changed 
strategies? Further treatments can be designed to more specifically test the mechanisms through 
which learning takes place.  For example, changing the game parameters during the middle of Part 
1 and observing whether and how behavior changes could begin to isolate whether it is 
participants’ understanding of the game structure (in which case we would expect to see immediate 
or nearly immediate changes in strategy) or something else underpinning the development of 
cooperation.  
An alternative interpretation of our results builds on these questions about the mechanisms 
through which cooperation is fostered and sustained in Part 1 and considers the specific way in 
which our institutional treatments are modeled.  It is important to note that the differences 
between the strong and weak institutional treatments in Part 1 are generated by varying the audit 
probability – the likelihood that an external auditor will review a decision and punish defection.  
Thus, in the strong institution condition cooperation is induced through a high probability of 
“punishment” for non-cooperative behavior. Players in this institutional condition learn that there 
are consequences for not cooperating, specifically in the form of being audited and receiving 0% of 
their raw payoff. The fear of punishment may be the reason for cooperation in Part 1.  However, 
when subjects in the strong institutions condition reach Part 2, they recognize that there is no 
punishment for free-riding in the public goods game and rationally decide to free-ride of the 
contributions on others.  In other words, it is possible that the institutions created in Part 1 may not 
foster a “culture of cooperative behavior” like we had intended, but instead might lead participants 
to develop a “culture of responding to punishments.”  This hypothesis is more consistent with the 
experimental results found in this paper, and could be tested by providing feedback regarding each 
participant’s contribution to the common project and including a punishment provision in the 
public goods game, then observing the rates at which participants punish others for uncooperative 
behavior.   
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In fact, our experiment resembles the exact opposite of the New York parking ticket 
situation – instead of a new law being enforced (as in the parking ticket case), the progression from 
Part 1 to Part 2 in this experiment is analogous to a case where a law forbidding something socially 
undesirable suddenly stops being enforced. For example, if radar speeding traps are removed from 
a major road, drivers may drive above the speed limit at higher rates because the fear of being 
caught is less salient; this is similar to the way in which participants move from Part 1, where their 
decisions are audited, to Part 2 where there is no monitoring or regulation of their behavior. This 
suggests that the mechanisms through which institutions are created could have important 
implications on participant behavior in subsequent social dilemmas, even if the immediate 
cooperative behavior caused by the institution appears to be the same.  
Once institutions are established, our design does not allow for us to measure the length of 
time for which institutional exposure affects behavior – or in other words, how long it takes for 
cooperation (or lack thereof) to fall apart and behavior to regress to the mean. Further, it does not 
allow us to consider the effects of learning across institutions – for example, if participants with a 
strong institutional history and participants with a weak institutional history were assigned to the 
same group in Part 2. In order to address this question, an extension of this study could be 
conducted in the field where social decisions of individuals exposed to different types of 
institutions are observed over a longer period of time, or in the laboratory by making participants 
with strong and weak institutional histories interact in Part 2 of the experiment.  Considering the 
rate at which learning occurs and which group adopts the dominant behavior of the other would be 
another interesting dimension through which to consider the salience and longevity of institutional 
exposure.  
The results we find on free-riding are also inconsistent with our initial hypothesis and 
previous literature (List, 2007). We would expect that free-riding by taking from a common project 
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would be more psychologically costly – especially when institutions are strong – and thus, less 
common, than free-riding by not giving.  One potential explanation for the high rates of free-riding 
in both the giving and taking frames could be participants’ previous exposure to the public goods 
game.  Experience with the public goods game would generate higher rates of free-riding, 
regardless of experimental treatment.   
Our data do not allow us to assess whether participants have previous experience with the 
public goods game, however, we can use field of study as a proxy for exposure to game theory. We 
expect that participants studying either economics or psychology are likely to understand the 
dominant strategy associated with the public goods game; we identify participants studying either 
of these two fields and use this as an approximate measure of game experience.  
Thirteen participants in the taking frame treatment identify as either economics or 
psychology majors; eight participants in the giving frame identify as one of the two. The fact that we 
find more participants in these fields assigned to the taking frame treatment suggests that 
experience with the game could possibly be biasing our results on free-riding; however, the analysis 
employed above is not sufficient to show this.  Using field of study as a proxy for game exposure 
majors ignores the 8% of participants who are not currently students and the additional 3% of 
participants who do not provide information about their field of study. Further, it is incorrect to 
assume that all participants studying one of these two fields has necessarily been exposed to the 
public goods game and similarly cannot be assumed that all participants not in these fields have no 
prior game theoretic experience.  
We calculate payoffs for Part 1 of the experiment based on one randomly selected round of 
the 30 played in order to prevent income effects. However, we acknowledge that it can also be 
argued that outside of the laboratory setting individuals do accrue income at different rates and 
levels and that the decisions they make may reflect or be influenced by their level of overall income 
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– thus, some might say that our treatment would be more realistic if we had allowed income to 
accumulate.  However, since the purpose of Part 1 is to establish institutions, we believe that it is 
critical to ensure that participants are making decisions on the basis of their perceived optimal best 
strategies throughout the entirety of the experiment.  We also note that there could be negative 
effects on a participant’s behavior in Part 2 if he or she happened to receive a very low payoff in the 
randomly selected round, despite earning higher numbers of points consistently through Part 1. In 
order to maintain identical parameters of the games, other than audit probability, it is necessary to 
use just a sample of rounds to calculate payoffs in order to protect against extremely high or low 
payoff values for participants in different treatments.  One potential way to try and address 
concerns associated with selecting one random round while still preventing extreme payoff 
differences and income effects significantly affecting participants’ strategies could be to select more 
than one random round to be used in calculating payoffs, or to average the participants’ point 
earnings in all rounds to determine payoffs for Part 1.  
In our analysis we consider whether there is any effect of status quo bias by considering the 
probability that a participant will take action against the status quo in Part 29 and find that across 
all four treatments, the majority of participants free-ride irrespective of whether doing so is the 
default or not. Thus, our results suggest that participants across all four treatment conditions prefer 
free-riding to full contribution.  It is difficult to determine whether this is because participants fully 
understand the dominant strategies of each treatment or whether there is another unobserved 
factor influencing behavior.  Specifically, we are unable to draw conclusions as to whether these 
results truly serve as evidence of an absence of a status quo effect. In particular, we are unable to 
                                                          
9 For participants in the giving treatment, the status quo decision is to keep all of one’s experimental points in 
their private account.  Thus, taking action is defined as giving one or more points to the common project.  The 
exact opposite is true for the taking treatment. The status quo decision is to leave all ten experimental points 
in the common project and action is defined as taking one or more points from the common project.  
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tell what potential role the status quo might play in our participants’ decisions because of the 




















This thesis found that both institutions and framing have a significant impact on 
cooperative behavior in social dilemmas and builds on previous literature examining the effect of 
culture and institutions on cooperation and the effect of decision framing on participant decisions.  
Specifically, we show that participants exposed to a strong institution in Part 1 cooperate at a 
higher rate than participants exposed to a weak institution condition. This difference in cooperation 
persists over time and is increased through learning. Being in the taking frame in Part 2 generates 
higher rates of free-riding than the giving frame, showing that consistent with previous research, 
there is an impact of framing on behavior. We also find that the interaction of these two variables, 
institutional history and framing, have a significant impact on cooperation, specifically the rate at 
which participants free-ride on the contributions of others in the public goods game.   
 Our experimental results suggest that while it is possible for researchers to establish robust 
institutional environments in a laboratory setting, there are limitations to the longevity and 
saliency of these created institutions on participant behavior.  Future research should seek to 
identify both the length of exposure necessary for participants to internalize an institution as well 
as the time frame over which institutional history influences behavior.  
To our knowledge, our study is the first to consider the interaction of institutions and 
framing on prosocial behavior specifically within the context of the public goods game.  Future 
research should also consider how the different mechanisms through which institutions are 
established affect cooperation. Namely, institutions can be determined both “externally” (through 
channels such as legal institutions and law enforcement) – like those in Part 1 of this experiment – 
or “internally” (through internal motives and reputation-building).  The current study only 
considers the effects of external institutions, but can be modified in future research to consider the 
impact of internal institutions. Internal institutions can be modeled by varying the probability of 
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being matched with the same partner in subsequent rounds of the game across treatments, keeping 
audit probability constant.  
This paper also finds that reframing the public goods game as taking from a common 
project has a very slight, but statistically insignificant effect on cooperation levels.  Importantly, a 
comparison of mean cooperation levels for participants in the giving and taking frame treatments 
shows that framing has an opposite effect from our predictions and what has been found in 
previous literature (ie. List, 2007).  Specifically, we find that participants in the taking frame 
contribute at a lower level and free-ride on the contributions of others more than participants in 
the giving treatment (Figures 8 and 11).  This divergence from the literature should be further 
considered.  In particular, future research should explore the potential impact of the feedback 
received between Parts 1 and 2 as a potential confounding factor influencing behavior, as well as 
the saliency of the frame treatments themselves.  
Finally, we show that the interaction of framing and institutional history does have an 
impact on behavior in a social dilemma.  One limitation of this study is that while we are able to see 
that strong institutions cause individuals to behave socially and not the other way around, we are 
unable to identify any such temporal relationship between the interaction of institutions and 
framing and prosocial behavior.  There is much scope for future research aimed at further 
understanding the relationship between institutions and framing, specifically through expanding 
the types of questions asked of participants regarding their strategies in each part and including 
variations of the experiment in which participants with different treatment backgrounds interact. 
While the laboratory provides a controlled environment in which to consider the impacts of 
institutions and framing on cooperation, replication and extensions of this design in the lab and in 
the field are necessary to adequately capture the complexity of human interactions within social 
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A1: STRONG/GIVING Instructions10 
 
After subjects are seated – Welcome screen in front of them.  
 
Welcome to this experiment. You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. It will 
last about one hour and consist of three parts and a post-experiment questionnaire.  At first your 
payment in this experiment will be calculated in points. At the end, you will be paid the dollar 
equivalent of the points you earned during the experiment (at an exchange rate of 1 point = 10 
cents), plus a $10 show-up fee in cash.  Communication between participants is not allowed during 
the experiment. You will remain anonymous throughout the experiment and there will be no way 
for us to identify you with the decisions that you make. We ask that you put your cell phones away 
now and not take them out for the duration of the experiment.  
 
Please read the instructions for Part 1, which will appear on your screen, carefully and press your 
assistance button if you have any questions. I will also read the instructions for Part 1 aloud. Please 
press NEXT as soon as you are ready to proceed to Part 1.  
 
Part 1 Instructions 
 
Part 1 of the experiment will now begin.  Please read the instructions on your screen carefully and 
press NEXT when you are ready to proceed. Part 1 will consist of a series of "interactions". At the 
beginning of each "interaction", you will be randomly matched with another individual in the room. 
You will then play a number of "rounds" with that individual. 
 
In each "round", you will be asked to choose between two options: A and B.  At the end of each 
round, you and the other player will each receive a payment in points.  This payment will be 
determined by the choices that you and the other player have made. 
 
Regardless of your decision of A or B, there is a 7/8 probability that your choice will be audited.  If 
your choice is audited and you have chosen option B, you will receive 0% of your payment for the 
round. If your choice is audited and you have chosen option A, you will receive 100% of your 
payment for the round. 
 
After each round, there is a 1/2 probability of another round with the same individual, and a 1/2  
probability that the interaction will end. This probability does not depend on how many rounds you 
have already played. Choices that you make will not influence either the number of interactions you 
have or the number of rounds in any interaction. 
 
If you have any questions about the instructions, please press your assistance button now. Please 
Press NEXT when you are ready to view the Round Summary and complete the brief quiz.   
 




                                                          
10
 Instructions were read aloud to participants and appeared onscreen between each part of the experiment. 
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Part 1 finishes – Part 2 about to begin.  
 
Part 1 is now over.  The instructions for Part 2 will appear onscreen.  We will proceed to Part 2 of 
the experiment as soon as everyone is ready.  Please remember that communication between 
participants is not allowed.  Are there any questions? Please press NEXT to proceed to Part 2.  
 
Part 2 Instructions 
 
In this part of the experiment, you have been randomly assigned to a group of 4 individuals in this 
room.  You will be asked to make a single decision. All group members will make this decision 
simultaneously 
 
Initially, you and each of the other group members start out with 10 points, while the common 
project starts out with 0 points. 
 
Next, you and each of the other group members must decide how many points (if any) they wish to 
give to the common project, which benefits all group members equally. 
 
The total points given to the common project after all group members have made their decision will 
be calculated.  This amount will be multiplied by 2 and then evenly split among all 4 group 
members. 
 
Your payment will equal the initial 10 points minus the number of points you give to the common 
project plus your share of the total points given to the common project.  
 
If you have any questions, please press your assistance button.  Please press NEXT when you are 
ready to proceed to the task summary and example. Please continue to press NEXT after you have 
completed the task on each screen.  
 
Part 2 finishes – Part 3 about to begin.  
 
Part 2 is now over.  Instructions for Part 3 will now appear onscreen.  We will proceed to Part 3 of 
the experiment as soon as everyone is ready.  Please remember that communication between 
participants is not allowed.  Are there any questions? Please press NEXT to proceed to Part 3.  
 
Part 3 Instructions  
 
In this task you have to make 10 decisions between 2 lotteries (Option A and Option B). Each row is 
a separate decision. One of the rows will be chosen at random, the lottery that you selected (either 
option A or option B) will be conducted and you will be paid according to the outcome of your 
preferred choice at an exchange rate of 1 point = 10 cents. 
For example, if the first row is randomly chosen, and you chose option A, the computer will conduct 
a lottery where the chance of winning 8 points is 1/10 and the chance of winning 6.4 points is 9/10.  
 
Conceptually, this resembles a situation where there is 1 blue ball in a box and 9 green balls. When 
we randomly pick a ball from the box and the blue ball is picked, you will receive 8 points. If the 
green ball is picked, you will receive 6.4 points. If you would have chosen option B instead, the 
computer would conduct a lottery where the chance of winning 15.4 points is 1/10 and the chance 




If you have any questions, please press your assistance button. Please continue to press NEXT after 
you have completed the task on each screen.  
 
Part 3 finishes – Questionnaire about to begin.  
 
The experimental portion is now over.  Please take a few minutes to answer the questionnaire that 
appears on your screen.  Your total final payment information will be available after you’ve 
completed this brief questionnaire.   
 
Questionnaire Finishes. Time for Payment! 
 
The questionnaire is now over.  To collect your final payment, you will be called according to your 






















 A2: STRONG/TAKING Instructions 
 
After subjects are seated – Welcome screen in front of them.  
 
Welcome to this experiment. You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. It will 
last about one hour and consist of three parts and a post-experiment questionnaire.  At first your 
payment in this experiment will be calculated in points. At the end, you will be paid the dollar 
equivalent of the points you earned during the experiment (at an exchange rate of 1 point = 10 
cents), plus a $10 show-up fee in cash.  Communication between participants is not allowed during 
the experiment. You will remain anonymous throughout the experiment and there will be no way 
for us to identify you with the decisions that you make. We ask that you put your cell phones away 
now and not take them out for the duration of the experiment.  
 
Please read the instructions for Part 1, which will appear on your screen, carefully and press your 
assistance button if you have any questions. I will also read the instructions for Part 1 aloud. Please 
press NEXT as soon as you are ready to proceed to Part 1.  
 
Part 1 Instructions 
 
Part 1 of the experiment will now begin.  Please read the instructions on your screen carefully and 
press NEXT when you are ready to proceed. Part 1 will consist of a series of "interactions". At the 
beginning of each "interaction", you will be randomly matched with another individual in the room. 
You will then play a number of "rounds" with that individual. 
 
In each "round", you will be asked to choose between two options: A and B.  At the end of each 
round, you and the other player will each receive a payment in points.  This payment will be 
determined by the choices that you and the other player have made. 
 
Regardless of your decision of A or B, there is a 7/8 probability that your choice will be audited.  If 
your choice is audited and you have chosen option B, you will receive 0% of your payment for the 
round. If your choice is audited and you have chosen option A, you will receive 100% of your 
payment for the round. 
 
After each round, there is a 1/2 probability of another round with the same individual, and a 1/2  
probability that the interaction will end. This probability does not depend on how many rounds you 
have already played. Choices that you make will not influence either the number of interactions you 
have or the number of rounds in any interaction. 
 
If you have any questions about the instructions, please press your assistance button now. Please 
Press NEXT when you are ready to view the Round Summary and complete the brief quiz.   
 
Please continue to press NEXT after you have completed the task on each screen.  
Part 1 finishes – Part 2 about to begin.  
 
Part 1 is now over.  The instructions for Part 2 will appear onscreen.  We will proceed to Part 2 of 
the experiment as soon as everyone is ready.  Please remember that communication between 





Part 2 Instructions 
 
In this part of the experiment, you have been randomly assigned to a group of 4 individuals in this 
room.  You will be asked to make a single decision. All group members will make this decision 
simultaneously 
 
Initially, you and each of the other group members start out with 0 points, while the common 
project starts out with 40 points 
 
Next, you and each of the other group members must decide how many points (if any) they wish to 
take from the common project, which benefits all group members equally. 
 
The total points left in the common project after all group members have made their decision will 
be calculated.  This amount will be multiplied by 2 and then evenly split among all 4 group 
members 
 
Your payment will equal the number of points you take from the common project plus your share of 
the total points left in the common project, explained above. 
 
If you have any questions, please press your assistance button.  Please press NEXT when you are 
ready to proceed to the task summary and example. Please continue to press NEXT after you have 
completed the task on each screen.  
 
Part 2 finishes – Part 3 about to begin.  
 
Part 2 is now over.  Instructions for Part 3 will now appear onscreen.  We will proceed to Part 3 of 
the experiment as soon as everyone is ready.  Please remember that communication between 
participants is not allowed.  Are there any questions? Please press NEXT to proceed to Part 3.  
 
Part 3 Instructions  
 
In this task you have to make 10 decisions between 2 lotteries (Option A and Option B). Each row is 
a separate decision. One of the rows will be chosen at random, the lottery that you selected (either 
option A or option B) will be conducted and you will be paid according to the outcome of your 
preferred choice at an exchange rate of 1 point = 10 cents. 
 
For example, if the first row is randomly chosen, and you chose option A, the computer will conduct 
a lottery where the chance of winning 8 points is 1/10 and the chance of winning 6.4 points is 9/10.  
 
Conceptually, this resembles a situation where there is 1 blue ball in a box and 9 green balls. When 
we randomly pick a ball from the box and the blue ball is picked, you will receive 8 points. If the 
green ball is picked, you will receive 6.4 points. If you would have chosen option B instead, the 
computer would conduct a lottery where the chance of winning 15.4 points is 1/10 and the chance 
of winning 0.4 points is 9/10. 
 
If you have any questions, please press your assistance button. Please continue to press NEXT after 






Part 3 finishes – Questionnaire about to begin.  
 
The experimental portion is now over.  Please take a few minutes to answer the questionnaire that 
appears on your screen.  Your total final payment information will be available after you’ve 
completed this brief questionnaire.   
 
Questionnaire Finishes. Time for Payment! 
 
The questionnaire is now over.  To collect your final payment, you will be called according to your 
























A3: WEAK/GIVING Instructions 
 
After subjects are seated – Welcome screen in front of them.  
 
Welcome to this experiment. You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. It will 
last about one hour and consist of three parts and a post-experiment questionnaire.  At first your 
payment in this experiment will be calculated in points. At the end, you will be paid the dollar 
equivalent of the points you earned during the experiment (at an exchange rate of 1 point = 10 
cents), plus a $10 show-up fee in cash.  Communication between participants is not allowed during 
the experiment. You will remain anonymous throughout the experiment and there will be no way 
for us to identify you with the decisions that you make. We ask that you put your cell phones away 
now and not take them out for the duration of the experiment.  
 
Please read the instructions for Part 1, which will appear on your screen, carefully and press your 
assistance button if you have any questions. I will also read the instructions for Part 1 aloud. Please 
press NEXT as soon as you are ready to proceed to Part 1.  
 
Part 1 Instructions 
 
Part 1 of the experiment will now begin.  Please read the instructions on your screen carefully and 
press NEXT when you are ready to proceed. Part 1 will consist of a series of "interactions". At the 
beginning of each "interaction", you will be randomly matched with another individual in the room. 
You will then play a number of "rounds" with that individual. 
 
In each "round", you will be asked to choose between two options: A and B.  At the end of each 
round, you and the other player will each receive a payment in points.  This payment will be 
determined by the choices that you and the other player have made. 
 
Regardless of your decision of A or B, there is a 1/8 probability that your choice will be audited.  If 
your choice is audited and you have chosen option B, you will receive 0% of your payment for the 
round. If your choice is audited and you have chosen option A, you will receive 100% of your 
payment for the round. 
 
After each round, there is a 1/2 probability of another round with the same individual, and a 1/2  
probability that the interaction will end. This probability does not depend on how many rounds you 
have already played. Choices that you make will not influence either the number of interactions you 
have or the number of rounds in any interaction. 
 
If you have any questions about the instructions, please press your assistance button now. Please 
Press NEXT when you are ready to view the Round Summary and complete the brief quiz.   
 
Please continue to press NEXT after you have completed the task on each screen.  
 
Part 1 finishes – Part 2 about to begin.  
 
Part 1 is now over.  The instructions for Part 2 will appear onscreen.  We will proceed to Part 2 of 
the experiment as soon as everyone is ready.  Please remember that communication between 




Part 2 Instructions 
 
In this part of the experiment, you have been randomly assigned to a group of 4 individuals in this 
room.  You will be asked to make a single decision. All group members will make this decision 
simultaneously 
 
Initially, you and each of the other group members start out with 10 points, while the common 
project starts out with 0 points. 
 
Next, you and each of the other group members must decide how many points (if any) they wish to 
give to the common project, which benefits all group members equally. 
 
The total points given to the common project after all group members have made their decision will 
be calculated.  This amount will be multiplied by 2 and then evenly split among all 4 group 
members. 
 
Your payment will equal the initial 10 points minus the number of points you give to the common 
project plus your share of the total points given to the common project.  
 
If you have any questions, please press your assistance button.  Please press NEXT when you are 
ready to proceed to the task summary and example. Please continue to press NEXT after you have 
completed the task on each screen.  
 
Part 2 finishes – Part 3 about to begin.  
 
Part 2 is now over.  Instructions for Part 3 will now appear onscreen.  We will proceed to Part 3 of 
the experiment as soon as everyone is ready.  Please remember that communication between 
participants is not allowed.  Are there any questions? Please press NEXT to proceed to Part 3.  
 
Part 3 Instructions  
 
In this task you have to make 10 decisions between 2 lotteries (Option A and Option B). Each row is 
a separate decision. One of the rows will be chosen at random, the lottery that you selected (either 
option A or option B) will be conducted and you will be paid according to the outcome of your 
preferred choice at an exchange rate of 1 point = 10 cents. 
 
For example, if the first row is randomly chosen, and you chose option A, the computer will conduct 
a lottery where the chance of winning 8 points is 1/10 and the chance of winning 6.4 points is 9/10.  
 
Conceptually, this resembles a situation where there is 1 blue ball in a box and 9 green balls. When 
we randomly pick a ball from the box and the blue ball is picked, you will receive 8 points. If the 
green ball is picked, you will receive 6.4 points. If you would have chosen option B instead, the 
computer would conduct a lottery where the chance of winning 15.4 points is 1/10 and the chance 
of winning 0.4 points is 9/10. 
 
If you have any questions, please press your assistance button. Please continue to press NEXT after 






Part 3 finishes – Questionnaire about to begin.  
 
The experimental portion is now over.  Please take a few minutes to answer the questionnaire that 
appears on your screen.  Your total final payment information will be available after you’ve 
completed this brief questionnaire.   
 
Questionnaire Finishes. Time for Payment! 
 
The questionnaire is now over.  To collect your final payment, you will be called according to your 

































A4: WEAK/TAKING Instructions 
 
After subjects are seated – Welcome screen in front of them.  
 
Welcome to this experiment. You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. It will 
last about one hour and consist of three parts and a post-experiment questionnaire.  At first your 
payment in this experiment will be calculated in points. At the end, you will be paid the dollar 
equivalent of the points you earned during the experiment (at an exchange rate of 1 point = 10 
cents), plus a $10 show-up fee in cash.  Communication between participants is not allowed during 
the experiment. You will remain anonymous throughout the experiment and there will be no way 
for us to identify you with the decisions that you make. We ask that you put your cell phones away 
now and not take them out for the duration of the experiment.  
 
Please read the instructions for Part 1, which will appear on your screen, carefully and press your 
assistance button if you have any questions. I will also read the instructions for Part 1 aloud. Please 
press NEXT as soon as you are ready to proceed to Part 1.  
 
Part 1 Instructions 
 
Part 1 of the experiment will now begin.  Please read the instructions on your screen carefully and 
press NEXT when you are ready to proceed. Part 1 will consist of a series of "interactions". At the 
beginning of each "interaction", you will be randomly matched with another individual in the room. 
You will then play a number of "rounds" with that individual. 
 
In each "round", you will be asked to choose between two options: A and B.  At the end of each 
round, you and the other player will each receive a payment in points.  This payment will be 
determined by the choices that you and the other player have made. 
 
Regardless of your decision of A or B, there is a 1/8 probability that your choice will be audited.  If 
your choice is audited and you have chosen option B, you will receive 0% of your payment for the 
round. If your choice is audited and you have chosen option A, you will receive 100% of your 
payment for the round. 
 
After each round, there is a 1/2 probability of another round with the same individual, and a 1/2  
probability that the interaction will end. This probability does not depend on how many rounds you 
have already played. Choices that you make will not influence either the number of interactions you 
have or the number of rounds in any interaction. 
 
If you have any questions about the instructions, please press your assistance button now. Please 
Press NEXT when you are ready to view the Round Summary and complete the brief quiz.   
 
Please continue to press NEXT after you have completed the task on each screen.  
 
Part 1 finishes – Part 2 about to begin.  
 
Part 1 is now over.  The instructions for Part 2 will appear onscreen.  We will proceed to Part 2 of 
the experiment as soon as everyone is ready.  Please remember that communication between 




Part 2 Instructions 
 
In this part of the experiment, you have been randomly assigned to a group of 4 individuals in this 
room.  You will be asked to make a single decision. All group members will make this decision 
simultaneously 
 
Initially, you and each of the other group members start out with 0 points, while the common 
project starts out with 40 points 
 
Next, you and each of the other group members must decide how many points (if any) they wish to 
take from the common project, which benefits all group members equally. 
 
The total points left in the common project after all group members have made their decision will 
be calculated.  This amount will be multiplied by 2 and then evenly split among all 4 group 
members 
 
Your payment will equal the number of points you take from the common project plus your share of 
the total points left in the common project, explained above. 
 
If you have any questions, please press your assistance button.  Please press NEXT when you are 
ready to proceed to the task summary and example. Please continue to press NEXT after you have 
completed the task on each screen.  
 
Part 2 finishes – Part 3 about to begin.  
 
Part 2 is now over.  Instructions for Part 3 will now appear onscreen.  We will proceed to Part 3 of 
the experiment as soon as everyone is ready.  Please remember that communication between 
participants is not allowed.  Are there any questions? Please press NEXT to proceed to Part 3.  
 
Part 3 Instructions  
 
In this task you have to make 10 decisions between 2 lotteries (Option A and Option B). Each row is 
a separate decision. One of the rows will be chosen at random, the lottery that you selected (either 
option A or option B) will be conducted and you will be paid according to the outcome of your 
preferred choice at an exchange rate of 1 point = 10 cents. 
 
For example, if the first row is randomly chosen, and you chose option A, the computer will conduct 
a lottery where the chance of winning 8 points is 1/10 and the chance of winning 6.4 points is 9/10.  
 
Conceptually, this resembles a situation where there is 1 blue ball in a box and 9 green balls. When 
we randomly pick a ball from the box and the blue ball is picked, you will receive 8 points. If the 
green ball is picked, you will receive 6.4 points. If you would have chosen option B instead, the 
computer would conduct a lottery where the chance of winning 15.4 points is 1/10 and the chance 
of winning 0.4 points is 9/10. 
 
If you have any questions, please press your assistance button. Please continue to press NEXT after 






Part 3 finishes – Questionnaire about to begin.  
 
The experimental portion is now over.  Please take a few minutes to answer the questionnaire that 
appears on your screen.  Your total final payment information will be available after you’ve 
completed this brief questionnaire.   
 
Questionnaire Finishes. Time for Payment! 
 
The questionnaire is now over.  To collect your final payment, you will be called according to your 









































A5: Consent Form: Decision Making and Behavior 
 
Please consider this information carefully before deciding whether to participate in this research. 
 
Purpose of the research: To explore individual decision-making in various tasks.  
 
What you will do in this research: If you volunteer to participate in this study, we will ask you to 
be a member of a group with other people making decisions.  You will be paid based on your own 
decisions, and in some cases, on the decisions made by other members of your group.  The specific 
payment structure and instructions will be given to you at the beginning of the experiment. At the 
end of the experiment you will be asked to complete a short questionnaire that asks several follow-
up questions about the experiment and some demographic information.  
 
Time required: Participation will take approximately 1 hour to complete. 
 
Risks: There are no anticipated risks associated with participating in this study.   
 
Benefits: There are no direct benefits for the participants beyond getting paid.  
 
Compensation: You will receive a $10 show-up fee regardless of your decision to participate. In 
addition, you may earn additional income based on your decisions in the experiment, and in some 
cases, on the decisions of others in your group.   
 
Confidentiality: Your participation in this study will remain confidential, and your identity will not 
be stored with your data.  Your responses will be assigned a code number, and there will not be any 
list connecting your name with this number. 
 
Participation and withdrawal: Your participation in this study is completely voluntary, and you 
may withdraw at any time without penalty.  If you withdraw, you will receive the show-up fee of 
$10. You may withdraw by informing the researcher that you no longer wish to participate (no 
questions will be asked). The experimenters may withdraw you from this research if circumstances 
arise which warrant doing so.  
 
To Contact the Researcher: If you have questions about this research, please contact Alexandra 
Van Geen, Harvard University, avangeen@fas.harvard.edu; Olga Shurchkov, Wellesley College, 
olga.shurchkov@wellesley.edu; or Prerana Nanda, Wellesley College, pnanda@wellesley.edu.  
 
Whom to contact about your rights in this research, for questions, concerns, suggestions, or complaints that 
are not being addressed by the researcher, or research-related harm: Jane Calhoun, Harvard University 
Committee on the Use of Human Subjects in Research, 1414 Massachusetts Avenue, Room 234, Cambridge, 
MA  02138.  Phone:  617-495-5459.  E-mail: jcalhoun@fas.harvard.edu. You may also contact the chair of the 




The nature and purpose of this research have been sufficiently explained and I agree to participate 
in this study.  I understand that I am free to withdraw at any time without incurring any penalty. 
 
Signature: _____________________________________ Date: __________________ 
Name (print): ________________________________________________ 
